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Out of Nothing (Philosophy of language) 
Abstract. Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that ‘nothing’ occurs as a 
singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) ‘The cosmos came into existence out 
of nothing’. Priest’s point is that, intuitively, (1) entails (C) ‘The cosmos came into existence at 
some time’, but this entailment relation is left unexplained if ‘nothing’ is treated as a quantifier. If 
Priest is right, the paradoxical notion of an object that is nothing plays a role in our very 
understanding of reality. In this note, we argue that Priest’s argument is unsound: the intuitive 
entailment relation between (1) and (C) does not offer convincing evidence that ‘nothing’ occurs as 
a term in (1). Moreover, we provide an explanation of why (1) is naturally taken to entail (C), which 
is both plausible and consistent with the standard, quantificational treatment of ‘nothing’. 
1. Graham Priest (2000: 23) rightly observes that the sentence: 
(1)  The cosmos came into existence out of nothing 
is naturally understood to entail that 
(C)  The cosmos came into existence at some time (viz., the cosmos’s life does not 
extend indefinitely towards the past). 
According to Priest, we cannot account for this prima facie entailment if we adopt the 
standard, quantificational treatment of ‘nothing’. For in that case, (1) could be equivalently 
rewritten as 
(1*)  No thing x is such that the cosmos came into existence out of x, 
which does not entail (C). Priest concludes that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in (1) (see 
also Priest 2002: 241). He would add that ‘nothing’, when so used, denotes the object that 
is nothingness (see Priest 2014). Others would regard it as an empty term (see Oliver and 
Smiley 2013). 
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Priest has a point here. It seems that (1) does entail (C), whereas (1*) does not. And 
plausibly, if ‘nothing’ is a quantified expression in (1), then (1) is tantamount to (1*). 
If Priest is right, then the paradoxical notion of an entity that is nothing is needed to 
make sense of a purely extensional sentence like (1).1 Which means, arguably, it is also 
needed to make sense of annihilation, of the very idea that our universe may be limited in 
space, and the like (for example, if we think that the entity that is nothing is involved in our 
understanding of (1), it is natural to think it is also involved in the understanding of claims 
like ‘x vanished into nothing’). Therefore, if Priest’s argument is sound, paradoxical notions 
lie very deep in our conception of reality. 
The main aim of this note is to argue that Priest’s argument is unsound: the intuition 
that (1) entails (C) does not provide convincing evidence that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in 
(1). However, the phenomenon Priest appeals to—viz., the semantic difference between 
(1) and (1*)—has independent interest. As a side task, we propose and discuss an account 
of this phenomenon that is both plausible and consistent with the quantificational 
treatment of ‘nothing’. 
                                                        
1 Compare Priest (2014: 55): ‘We may say that Hegel and Heidegger both wrote about nothing. This 
does not mean that for no x did Hegel and Heidegger write about x’. We agree with Priest that 
‘nothing’ is used as a term in 
(*)  Hegel and Heidegger both wrote about nothing. 
But the difference between extensional and non-extensional contexts matters a lot here. At best, 
the truth of (*) proves that a thing called ‘nothing’ is an imaginary item in some philosopher’s 
mind. The truth of (1), assuming that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term therein, makes for a dramatically 
stronger conclusion, namely, that the thing called ‘nothing’ had a role in the very foundation of 
reality. (To get a feeling of how deep the contrast between (*) and (1) is, compare ‘Milton wrote 
about Satan’s desires’ with ‘The universe came into existence out of Satan’s desires’.) 
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2. Here is our objection to Priest’s argument. Let us assume that (1) is true, that is, that the 
universe did come into existence out of nothing. If so, we can conclude that the universe 
came into existence out of nothing pre-existing. Therefore, (1) entails: 
(2)  The cosmos came into existence out of nothing pre-existing. 
Some philosophers would be happy to take (2) not just as a consequence of (1) but as 
equivalent to (1).2 In any event, if (1) entails (2), then a fortiori it entails:  
(3) The cosmos came into existence out of no pre-existing chunk of clay. 
Now let us assume that the prepositional objects ‘nothing pre-existing’ and ‘no pre-
existing chunk of clay’ are quantified expressions. If so, and if the traditional style of 
paraphrase is correct, then (2) and (3) are tantamount, respectively, to 
(2*)  No thing x that pre-existed the cosmos is such that the cosmos came into 
existence out of x, 
(3*)  No chunk of clay x that pre-existed the cosmos is such that the cosmos came into 
existence out of x. 
But again, these are the wrong results. Intuitively, (2) and (3)—precisely like (1)—entail (C), 
while (2*) and (3*) do not. 
If Priest’s reasoning were sound, we should conclude that ‘nothing pre-existing’ and ‘no 
pre-existing chunk of clay’ occur as terms in (2) and (3), respectively. But we feel no 
temptation to do so. For one thing, we cannot see what sort of object, say, ‘no pre-existing 
chunk of clay’ would denote in that case (the object that is no-pre-existing-chunk-of-clay-
ness not being an option). Note that the problem is not that the denotatum does not exist; 
                                                        
2 Referring to Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles (932), Kretzmann (1999: 74) claims that ‘out of 
nothing pre-existing’ (ex nullo praeexistente) is “a wordy surrogate for the familiar, elegant ‘out of 
nothing’ (ex nihilo)”. 
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the problem is that no reasonable candidate denotatum comes into mind at all. Moreover, 
Priest’s intended conclusion is that there is something special with ‘nothing’, which makes 
it deeply different from ordinary negative quantified expressions. Therefore, holding that 
‘no pre-existing chunk of clay’ is a singular term as it occurs in (3), besides being a major 
departure from any contemporary semantic theory we know of, would defeat the very 
purpose of Priest’s argument. 
In passing, let us observe that there is nothing exceptional in prepositional phrases like 
‘out of nothing (pre-existing)’ or ‘out of no pre-existing chunk of clay’. Consider, for 
instance, the following sentences:  
(4)  John hit Tom for nothing; 
(5)  Lincoln began to study jurisprudence with nobody;  
(6) Mary said ‘Hello!’ to no one in particular.  
The inference from (4) to ‘John hit Tom’ is intuitively valid, or at least as valid as the 
inference from (1) (or from (2), or from (3)) to (C). And the same holds for (5)–(6): each of 
them intuitively entails the sentence obtained by dropping the prepositional phrase 
therein. But again, we feel no temptation to regard ‘nothing’, ‘nobody’, and ‘no one in 
particular’ as singular terms. 
It is thus plausible to suppose that (1) is naturally understood to entail (C) for reasons 
that are independent of whether ‘nothing’ occurs as a term or a quantifier in (1). 
Therefore, Priest’s argument does not provide convincing evidence that ‘nothing’ occurs as 
a term in (1) (regardless of whether ‘nothing’ actually occurs as a term or not). We 
conclude that Priest’s argument is invalid and, hence, unsound. 
It has been sometimes objected to us that, in our case against Priest’s argument, we rely 
on false analogy. More specifically, we presuppose that (1) has the same form as (2) (or 
(3)). This presupposition is false, so the objection goes, precisely because there is a neat 
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difference between ‘nothing’ and ‘nothing pre-existing’. It is independently plausible to 
suppose that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term (and not as a quantified expression) in (1), while it 
is not plausible to suppose that ‘nothing pre-existing’ occurs as a term in (2)—for instance, 
because the former, but not the latter, can be substituted salva significatione with a term 
like ‘nothingness’. If, however, ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in (1) and ‘nothing pre-existing’ 
occurs as a quantified expression in (C), then we are comparing sentences endowed with 
different logical forms. 
The problem with this objection is obvious: it begs the question. It is dialectically unfair 
to rebut our objection against Priest’s argument that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in (1) 
based on the view that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in (1). This kind of dialectical move can 
be used to secure any possible argument from any possible attack. 
We are prepared to grant that there are further arguments for the view that ‘nothing’ 
occurs as a term in (1), independent of the one we have discussed thus far. However, it 
exceeds the scope of this brief note to rebut any such argument. 
3. At this point, our main task—arguing that Priest’s argument is unsound—is done. We 
think, however, that the phenomenon Priest pointed out has independent interest. Thus, 
let us say something positive on the intuition that (1), as opposed to (1*), entails (C).  
Let us start by stressing that, albeit there is a natural understanding of (1) in which (1) 
entails (C), this understanding is not the only possible one. For instance, the following 
dialogue sounds perfectly coherent to us: 
(D)  — What did the cosmos come into existence out of? 
— The cosmos came into existence out of nothing: it always existed. 
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Sentence (1), as it occurs in (D), is not understood to entail (C). Hence, it is important to 
keep in mind that the entailment relation between (1) and (C) is not there independently 
of the way in which (1) is understood. 
We think that Priest is definitely right in maintaining that (1) is semantically different 
from what he takes to be its quantificational analysis, (1*). However, the difference has 
little to do with the distinction between terms and quantifiers. The point is rather that (1*) 
is a negative sentence—that is, a sentence in which a negation takes sentential scope—
while sentences like (1) and its cognates are naturally understood as positive sentences 
with negative prepositional objects. To illustrate, compare (1) with: 
(1N) The cosmos didn’t come into existence out of anything. 
Out of the blue, (1) and (1N) convey different contents. (1) says that the cosmos came into 
existence in a certain ‘negative’ way, namely, out of nothing. In contrast, (1N) says that the 
cosmos did not come into existence in a certain ‘positive’ way, namely, out of something. 
Nevertheless, if our only option of formalisation is the quantificational treatment offered 
by Priest, we are forced to analyse both (1) and (1N) as the same, negative sentence (1*). 
The moral is, we need a more sophisticated formalisation, which enables us to get the 
difference between negative sentences and positive sentences with negative prepositional 
objects right. Within this note, we shall limit ourselves to considering Davidson’s (1967) 
well-known event analysis.3 
                                                        
3 We stick with Davidson’s original style of analysis for it is simple and very well known among 
philosophers, but our favourite choice would be a neo-Davidsonian treatment (see Maienborn 
2012 for an overview of both Davidson’s original proposal and its main developments). More 
specifically, we think that the use of (something like) neo-Davidsonian thematic roles is 
indispensable to make for a sufficiently general account of the difference between negative 
sentences and positive sentences involving negative objects.  
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In a Davidsonian frame, the perceived difference between (1) and (1N) is dealt with in 
terms of a scope distinction: 
(1†) Some event e of the cosmos coming into existence took place and no x is such 
that e took place out of x, 
(1‡) It is not the case that (some event e of the cosmos coming into existence took 
place and some x is such that e took place out of x), 
that is (ignoring tense-related complexities): 
  $e (ComeIntoExistence (Cosmos, e) Ù ¬$x (OutOf (e, x))), 
 ¬$e (ComeIntoExistence (Cosmos, e) Ù $x (OutOf (e, x))). 
If (1) is analysed as (1†), then it does entails (C), for (1†) entails that the cosmos came 
into existence—and there is no way to come into existence without coming into existence 
at some time. Let us also note that a Davidsonian treatment allows to account for the 
distinction between two readings of (1)—a preferred, positive reading and the alternative, 
negative reading found in (D)—in terms of a scope ambiguity. 
While the appeal to a Davidsonian analysis is useful for the purpose of clarity and 
definiteness, it is not indispensable. If you feel uncomfortable with the ontological 
commitment to events that an analysis like (1†) seems to inject into (1), you can safely 
analyse it as (say) ‘The cosmos came into existence, and did it out of nothing’. 
Indeed, to offer an informal account of the intuition that (1) entails (C), there is no need 
to resort to a paraphrase at all. All is needed is to keep in mind that, in its most natural 
reading, (1) is a positive sentence, which concerns the way in which the universe came into 
existence, and not a negative sentence, which denies that the universe came into 
existence in a certain way. 
Let us note that this explanation of why (1) intuitively entails (C) is much more general 
than Priest’s, as it can be easily extended to sentences like (2)–(6), in which the 
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prepositional object is not plausibly regarded as a singular term. From this viewpoint, 
Priest’s explanation sounds unmistakably ad hoc.  
4. Two referees for this Journal have suggested (but not endorsed) two explanations of the 
perceived entailment between (1) and (C) that are different from both our own account 
and Priest’s.  These explanations have independent interest, and we are happy to discuss 
them here. 
According to the first explanation, albeit (1) is correctly analysed as (1*), it conveys 
something like the content of (C) by way of Gricean conversational implicature. If we 
understand the proposal correctly, the point is that (1) would amount to an unnecessarily 
poor (or misleading) informative contribution if used by a speaker who believes that the 
universe did not come into existence at all. Whatever its merits, it seems to us this 
explanation cannot be used to rebut Priest’s argument. Recall that Priest’s point is that (1) 
is perceived to entail (C) in a way that (1*) (or its informal counterpart (1N)) is not. But if (1) 
is correctly analysed as (1*), then (1), (1*) and (1N) all have the same content, and so the 
Gricean explanation equally applies to each of them. 
The second explanation, mentioned by the other reviewer, pivots on presuppositions. It 
is well known that manner adverbials such as ‘abruptly’ or ‘with a knife’ trigger the 
presupposition that the main phrase they are attached to is true (see, e.g., Abbott 2006). 
For instance, ‘The cosmos came into existence abruptly’ presupposes (C), as witnessed by 
the fact that its negation also presupposes (C) (albeit this time the presupposition is 
cancellable, as is generally the case with presuppositions projected from negative 
contexts). Now, so the explanation goes, it is plausible to assume that phrases like ‘out of 
nothing’ and ‘out of something’ are also presupposition triggers. As evidence for this 
assumption, the reviewer points out that the negations of (1) and of  
(7) The cosmos came into existence out of something  
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both presuppose (C) as well. And if we take ‘out of nothing’ as a presupposition trigger, the 
reviewer suggests, then we are in a position to explain the entailment relation between (1) 
and (C) with no need to resort to either our explanation or Priest’s. 
We are sympathetic with the view that (1) presupposes (C)—at least insofar as out of 
nothing counts as a manner of coming into existence. Moreover, if one adopts (some 
refined version of) our account, one can get this presuppositional fact right, for one can 
assign ‘out of nothing’ a formal role akin to that of manner adverbials. 
Still, we strongly doubt that the presuppositional explanation is sufficient to rebut 
Priest’s argument. Among other things, it suffers from a similar problem as the Gricean 
account. Suppose that we analyse both (1) and (1N) as (1*)—that is, as (a semiformal 
version of) the negation of (7). If so, the presuppositional explanation predicts that (1) 
presupposes (C). However, it also predicts that (1N) presupposes (1). Therefore, the appeal 
to presuppositions, as such, does not explain why (1) is felt to entail (C) in a way that a 
negative sentence like (1N) is not. Priest’s challenge strikes back. 
We are conscious that these all-too-brief remarks against the Gricean and the 
presuppositional accounts are not unassailable. As an example, our criticism presupposes 
Priest’s view that (1) is inferentially different from (1*) (and (1N)), and this presupposition 
can be contested. As another example, the advocate of the presuppositional account could 
try to argue that something in the structure of (1N) blocks the projection of presupposition 
(C). Lack of space prevents us from discussing these and other possible reactions further. 
Let us note, however, that even if we are wrong and either the Gricean or the 
presuppositional account is correct, the main goal of the present note—viz., arguing that 
Priest’s argument is invalid—is still secured, for both explanations are independent of 
whether ‘nothing’ occurs as a term or as a quantifier in (1). 
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5. For all that has been said so far, it may still be true that the notion of an entity that is 
nothing plays a somewhat basic role in our understanding of reality. Priest’s argument, 
however, clearly fails to prove that. Moreover, as the analogy between (1) and examples 
(2)–(6) illustrates, there are general linguistic reasons to think that, at least insofar as 
coming into existence out of nothing is taken to be a way of coming into existence, the 
notion of an entity that is nothing plays no essential role in our understanding of 
generation ex nihilo. By the same reasoning, similar conclusions hold for annihilation, the 
(possible) finiteness of the universe, and the like. 
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